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Abstract
When potential beneficiaries share their knowledge and attitudes about a policy
intervention, their decision to participate and the e↵ectiveness of both the policy and
its evaluation may be influenced. This matters most notably in integrated social poli-
cies with several components. We examine spillover e↵ects on take-up behaviors in the
context of a conditional cash transfer program in rural Mexico. We exploit exogenous
variations in the local frequency of beneficiaries generated by the program’s random-
ized evaluation. A higher treatment density in the areas surrounding the evaluation
villages increases the take-up of scholarships and enrollment at the lower-secondary
level. These cross-village spillovers operate exclusively within households receiving
another component of the program, and do not carry over larger distances. While
several tests reject heterogeneities in impact due to spatial variations in program im-
plementation, we find evidence to suggest that spillovers stem partly from the sharing
of information about the program among eligible households.
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1 Introduction
Demand-side schooling interventions have now become an important component of social
policies in developing countries. The available empirical evidence suggests that cash subsidies
in particular can have a large e↵ect on schooling decisions (e.g., Glewwe & Kremer 2006).
These interventions have been found to be e↵ective devices for encouraging the human capital
investments of poor households (e.g., Parker et al. 2008 and Fiszbein & Schady 2009). Recent
studies have documented that they can also induce a set of non-market interactions that
can further increase their e↵ects (Angelucci et al. 2010, Bobonis & Finan 2009, and Lalive
& Cattaneo 2009). Social interactions a↵ecting preferences for investments in education
and transfers within extended families have, in particular, been posited and documented.
However, there is still incomplete knowledge of the specific networks within which those
interactions occur and the underlying mechanisms at play.
The sharing of knowledge and attitudes about policy interventions among networks of
potential beneficiaries is one set of social interaction that remains under-documented in the
setting of social policies in developing countries. The role of information-sharing and initial
preferences and prejudices in determining program participation has been emphasized in the
context of social policies in the United States. For instance, Bertrand et al. (2000) and
Aizer & Currie (2004) find evidence of networks e↵ects, i.e., correlations in program take-up
decisions within neighborhoods and ethnic groups. In the case of the Food Stamp Program,
Daponte et al. (1999) find that ignorance about the program contributes to non-participation.
The conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs that have been recently implemented in
developing countries create many opportunities for knowledge spillovers between beneficia-
ries. These opportunities are likely to a↵ect the take-up of some subsidies, notably schooling
subsidies, and are influenced by three types of factors that span both supply and demand
sides. First, in integrated social policies, cash subsidies for schooling tend to be associated
with complementary interventions for the provision of health care or support for better nu-
trition. Beneficiaries do not necessarily participate in all interventions, so that there is an
intensive margin for potential recipients to increase their participation in the program by
taking up more components. Second, the recipients of the transfers, notably women and
mothers, regularly encounter each other during program operations, for instance in meetings
of beneficiaries or during activities of complementary interventions, such as visits to health
centers. Third, the targeting of those interventions implies that participants often have
similar socioeconomic backgrounds and are thus likely to identify with each other (Akerlof
1997). Hence, demand-side schooling interventions are likely to both enhance the existing
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interactions among groups of beneficiaries, and to further shape those groups, thus producing
externalities that would not occur were individuals treated in isolation.
In this paper, we examine the role of spillover e↵ects, in the form of information sharing
within networks of potential beneficiaries, and in shaping the take-up of the schooling subsidy
component of the Progresa-Oportunidades CCT program (see, e.g., Schultz 2004, and Parker
et al. 2008). The program entails several unbundled components in addition to the schooling
subsidies, notably food stipends conditional on health checks. While the take-up of the
nutrition and health component is almost 100 percent, a large share of children eligible for
transfers for secondary schooling remain un-enrolled.
The program targets poor households in small villages located in rural areas of Mexico.
Due to the high level of program penetration and geographic targeting, the topography
of the area covered by the program consists of clusters of neighboring villages with a high
density of beneficiary households. In this context, program beneficiaries living in neighboring
villages are likely to interact in several ways, thereby potentially sharing information about
the program. In order to examine the e↵ects of those interactions, we investigate the extent
to which variations in the local frequency of the program in areas surrounding beneficiary
villages a↵ects the take-up response of potential beneficiaries.
Spillovers have previously been examined in the context of Progresa - Oportunidades
by comparing the outcomes of ineligible and eligible households in the same villages by
means of a partial-population design (Mo tt 2001). Accordingly, Bobonis & Finan (2009)
and Lalive & Cattaneo (2009) have found evidence of spillovers through peer e↵ects in
school enrollment, and Angelucci & De Giorgi (2009), Angelucci et al. (2010) and Angelucci
et al. (2012) provide evidence of transfers within both village and household-level networks.1
However, in the Progresa-Oportunidades setting many beneficiary communities are very close
to each other, thus spillovers may occur not only within but also across villages.
To investigate the presence of neighborhood e↵ects, we combine data from the experimen-
tal evaluation of the program with information on the geo-referenced locations of the villages
benefitting from it. We focus our analysis on the secondary school participation decisions of
program-eligible children, which is the primary short-run outcome of the intervention and
the key requirement associated with the largest component of the in-cash transfer.
We use a simple empirical framework that allows us to disentangle the e↵ects of the
incentives resulting from the program eligibility of the household (and the village it resides
1Other recent examples from the literature include Duflo & Saez (2003) who examine the take-up of
retirement plans within academic departments, and Kuhn et al. (2011) who study spillover e↵ects of lottery
winnings within Dutch postal codes.
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in) from the indirect e↵ects arising from the local density of program recipients at the level
of areas surrounding targeted villages. In particular, we exploit the randomized evalua-
tion design and the clustered spatial distribution of the villages in our sample in order to
identify the causal e↵ects of program externalities generated by those neighboring villages
selected in the experimental treatment group. Next, we investigate whether spillovers arise
in this setting because of social interactions between program beneficiaries, or as a result
of other changes associated with variations in the local density of the program across areas
surrounding villages.
We find evidence of a positive e↵ect of the local frequency of participants in the program
over short distances (0–5 km) on secondary school participation decisions, which tend to
quickly dissipate at larger distances (5–10 km). Such a spillover e↵ect does not increase
linearly with the number of treated villages, with estimated e↵ects of, respectively, one or
two or more treated villages in the neighboring area on secondary school enrollment of 6.1
and 8.0 percent. The magnitude of the indirect e↵ect of the program is substantial when
compared to the direct e↵ect of own village treatment of 9.7 percent.
Crucially, these spatial externalities appear to exclusively a↵ect children from beneficiary
households; there is no evidence of such e↵ects for children in the control group and for
those in treated villages who are not eligible for the program. This remarkable heterogeneity
sheds light on the mechanisms behind program externalities. Interactions within networks of
potential beneficiaries spanning across villages seem to have contributed to increase the take-
up of the educational component of the program and heighten its impacts on schooling. We
argue that, while interactions through preexisting social networks should a↵ect all households
that share local resources, social interactions that are restricted to program beneficiaries are
likely to be associated with knowledge and attitudes toward the program. Accordingly, we
find that our variation in local treatment frequency is associated with increased knowledge
among eligible households, about the di↵erent components of the program – notably the
schooling subsidies.
Some sort of spatial variation in the delivery of the program among evaluation villages
could, in principle, explain the observed relationship between the local density of treatment
and the take-up of schooling subsidies. This may occur if, for instance, areas with more evalu-
ation villages benefit from more e cient program operations, or receive larger investments in
supply infrastructure, thereby helping recipients comply with the schooling requirements of
the program. However, using direct measures of e ciency of program operations or schooling
infrastructures, we find little support in the data for this alternative interpretation.
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Our results thus provide evidence of the e↵ect of the local frequency of treatment on
the take-up of the di↵erent components of social policies. We find evidence to suggest that
knowledge spillovers among networks of beneficiaries is likely to be driving those e↵ects. Our
findings also relate to other studies which have used experimental variations of treatment
frequency to identify the e↵ects of the spillover of interventions (e.g., Miguel & Kremer 2004,
Banerjee et al. 2010, and Ichino & Schundeln 2012). However, those studies were conducted
during small-scale interventions, and hence potentially miss important e↵ects that occur
during the full-scale implementation of a program.2 Our results shed light on those scaling-
up e↵ects by examining spatial externalities in an experimental sample surveyed in the midst
of the implementation of the policy on a large scale.
2 Setting and Data
2.1 Program features
Initiated in 1997 and still in e↵ect, Progresa-Oportunidades is a large-scale social program
that aims to foster the accumulation of human capital in the poorest communities of Mexico
by providing both cash and in-kind benefits in the key areas of health and education, which
are conditional on specific behaviors. The program grants scholarships and school supplies
to children aged under 17, conditional on regular attendance at one of the four last grades
of primary schooling (grades 3 to 6) or one of the three grades of junior secondary schooling
(grades 7 to 9). The scholarships increase in amount with school grade level achieved, and
in grades 7 to 9 the scholarships are larger for girls than boys. The program also distributes
cash transfers for the purchase of food, provides food supplements, and promotes health care
through free preventive education intervention on hygiene and nutrition. The distribution of
the food stipends and nutritional supplements are conditional on health care visits at public
clinics. The benefits are delivered to the female head of the household (usually the mother)
on a bimonthly basis after verification of each family member’s attendance at the relevant
facility.3
The Progresa program is targeted both at the village and household levels. During the
first years of the program, poor rural households were selected through a centralized process
2To partially overcome this issue, researchers have recently begun to inject experimental variations
directly into the intensity of spillover e↵ects by varying the saturation of individuals treated within treated
clusters (Baird et al. 2014, Crepon et al. 2013).
3Overall cash transfer amounts can be substantial: the median benefits are 176 pesos per month (roughly
18 USD in 1998), equivalent to about 28 percent of the monthly income of beneficiary families.
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which encompassed three main steps. First, villages were ranked by a composite index of
marginality, computed using information on socioeconomic characteristics and access to the
program infrastructures from the censuses of 1990 and 1995.4 Second, potentially eligible
localities were grouped based on geographical proximity, and relatively isolated communities
were excluded from the selection process. Third, eligible households were selected using
information on covariates of poverty obtained from a field census conducted in each locality
before its incorporation into the program.5
The program started in 1997 in 6,300 localities with about 300,000 beneficiary households,
and expanded rapidly during the following years. In 1998, it was delivered to 34,400 localities
(1.6 million households), and in 1999, coverage increased to 48,700 localities (2.3 million
households). The expansion of the program continued in subsequent years, both in rural
and urban areas.
An experimental evaluation of the program was conducted during this phase of geograph-
ical expansion in rural areas. A sample of 506 villages was randomly drawn from a set of
localities that had been selected to be incorporated into the program, and were located in
seven central states of Mexico (Guerrero, Hidalgo, Queretaro, Michoacan, Puebla, San Luis
de Potosi, and Veracruz), after stratification by geographic region (which coincide roughly
with the States) and population size. The randomness of the evaluation sample is corrobo-
rated in a supplemental appendix (Section A). We document in particular that evaluation
localities do not have di↵erent observable characteristics compared to non-evaluation locali-
ties located in the same neighborhoods. Also, the characteristics of evaluation localities and
their population are not statistically significantly associated with the number of evaluation
localities once the number of non-evaluation localities in their neighborhood are controlled
for. Of those villages, 320 localities were randomly assigned to the treatment group and
started receiving the program’s benefits in March–April 1998; the remaining 186 formed the
control group and were thus prevented from receiving the program benefits until November
1999.
4Localities with fewer than 50 or more than 2,500 inhabitants were excluded during the first years of
the program. We use the words “locality” and “village” interchangeably when referring to distinct census-
designated rural population clusters, i.e., settlements in which inhabitants live in neighboring sets of living
quarters and have a name and locally recognized status (including hamlets, villages, farms, and other clus-
ters). Rural localities (also called rural communities), or villages, are defined as having fewer than 2,500
inhabitants.
5A proxy-mean index was computed as a weighted average of household income (excluding children),
household size, durables, land and livestock, education, and other physical characteristics of the dwelling.
Households were informed that their eligibility status would not change until at least November 1999, irre-
spective of any variation in household income.
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2.2 Program take-up
Importantly for our purposes, the two transfer components are unbundled. Households
declared eligible to receive benefits can take up food stipends, scholarships, or both. They
can also choose to receive the scholarships for some but not all of their eligible children.
Beyond transfer amounts, take-up decisions are largely dependent on the tightness of the
conditions attached to each grant component. While nominally conditional, a substantial
fraction of the transfers is de facto unconditional. In particular, the conditions attached to
the food stipends and scholarships for primary school children do not seem to incur a high
cost to households, because school enrollment at that level is almost 100 percent. We use
data to document take-up from the administration of the program on the distribution of the
di↵erent transfers in the 320 treatment localities of the evaluation. This data confirms the
complete take-up of the food stipends: at the end of 1998 and 1999, respectively 97.1 and
98.0 percent of eligible households in those localities received the transfers.
In contrast, the conditionality of the scholarships at the secondary level is binding for
many households whose eligible school-age children would not have gone to school in the
absence of the program. The same data indicates that, respectively, 83.0 and 91.3 percent of
households that are eligible for a scholarship for at least one child enrolled at the primary or
secondary level received one. However, only 63.7 percent of children who were eligible for a
scholarship for secondary-level school attended school in 1998, with 61.9 percent attending
in 1999.
Hence, partial take-up of the program benefits is prevalent in this setting, whereby some
eligible households comply with the food stipend conditions but refrain from enrolling some
or all of their children in secondary school. However, once they are incorporated into the
program, recipients can further adjust their behavior by enrolling some of their program-
eligible children. While take-up of the food transfers is almost complete, there is thus a
margin for increasing the take-up of the schooling component, which can be seen as an
intensive margin of program participation.
2.3 Village neighborhoods
In this paper, we use the term ‘neighborhood’ to describe areas within a given radius around
each evaluation village. We borrow this terminology from a literature based mainly on urban
data, but in our context, ‘neighborhood’ means an area or cluster of villages.
In order to characterize the local densities of the intervention (in the neighborhoods),
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we combine information from the program administration, indicating which localities were
eligible for the program at the end of 1998 and 1999, with information from the 2000 popula-
tion census and the annual school census. The population census provides the geographical
coordinates (latitudes and longitudes) for all the rural localities in Mexico, while the school
census provides the coordinates of all secondary schools. The geo-referenced data further
allows us to identify the locations of the evaluation localities.6
As in many rural regions of Latin America and elsewhere, the topography of the area
covered by the program consists of clusters of villages with a quasi-continuum of dwellings,
rather than isolated villages. On average, there are 22 localities with an overall population
of roughly 6,400 inhabitants within an area defined by a 5 km radius from each evaluation
village. This proximity favors the interactions between inhabitants of neighboring villages.
Looking now at the intervention, Figure 1 depicts the geographic scope of the Progresa
penetration during the first two years of program roll-out in the seven central states where
the evaluation took place. The rural localities targeted by the program in 1998 and 1999 are
shown in light and dark grey respectively, while treatment and control localities are reported
in red and blue. In order to provide a more in-depth depiction of the areas surrounding
evaluation villages, the map features a smaller-scale view of a region in the State of Michoacan
in which circles of 5 km radius are drawn around each evaluation village.
Both maps reveal that beneficiary and evaluation villages tend to be geographically clus-
tered – with more deprived areas featuring a higher program frequency. These patterns are
confirmed by descriptive statistics of the areas surrounding the evaluation sample, which
are shown in Table 1. By the end of 1998, there are on average 10 program-beneficiary
localities within a neighborhood defined by a 5 km radius around each evaluation village.
Those localities have an average total population of 834 children aged 6 to 14, of which on
average 386 (46 percent) receive scholarships from Progresa (column 1).7 Moreover, several
evaluation villages are indeed located very close together. Of the 506 evaluation localities,
139 (27 percent) have another evaluation locality within 5 km, 57 (11 percent) have two
such localities, and 16 (3 percent) have three or more. Thus, 212 (41 percent) villages in the
6We have used o cial information on the listing of all rural localities receiving the program (broken
down by each program component) at the closing of each fiscal year in 1998 and 1999 in order to verify
which localities were receiving the program in late 1998 and 1999. A fraction (about 20 percent) of control
localities started receiving the program’s food stipends by November 1999, but none of those villages had
received any scholarship by that date. We thus continue to treat those observations as belonging to the
control group in November 1999.
7Evaluation villages tend to be less populated than non-evaluation villages (average total population
in the two groups is 258 and 338, respectively), while the marginalization index is on average very similar
(4.66 vs. 4.72, respectively). Accordingly, there are on average slightly more scholarship recipients in non-
evaluation villages (49.2) than in evaluation villages (34.5).
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experiment have other evaluation villages in a 5 km radius. Our empirical analysis identifies
the e↵ects of cross-village externalities for these villages. On average, evaluation villages
have, respectively, 0.62 other evaluation localities, and 0.40 localities allocated to the exper-
imental treatment group, within a 5 km radius. The density of the program, as captured by
the numbers of both non-evaluation and evaluation beneficiary villages, roughly doubles in
areas, with more marginalized localities (columns 2–3). This is consistent with the targeting
design of the Progresa intervention discussed above. In addition, and as expected by the
village-level random program assignment among the evaluation localities, there are virtually
no di↵erences in the density of the program between neighborhoods with treated or control
centroids (columns 4–5).
Basic education and health infrastructures serve areas that comprise several neighboring
villages. For instance, only 14 percent of the villages in the evaluation sample have a health
clinic. Yet, 68 percent have access to such a facility within 5 km. Similarly, most localities
do not have a junior secondary school – only 17 percent in the evaluation sample – while 93
percent have access to one or more junior secondary schools in other villages within 5 km.
Hence, households from di↵erent program localities located in the same area can interact
when utilizing social infrastructure. Furthermore, some operations which are specific to the
program are also organized in conjunction for several neighboring villages. This is most
notably the case of the distribution of transfers in temporary and mobile outposts – located
in hub localities – which serve an additional function to assist beneficiaries and disseminate
information on the program. Hence, program beneficiaries from di↵erent neighboring villages
can interact in a number of places.
2.4 Sample description
We combine the geo-referenced locality data mentioned above with three of the five rounds
of the evaluation survey, collected in October 1997 (from the baseline targeting ENCASEH
survey), October 1998 (second round of the ENCEL evaluation surveys), and November 1999
(fourth round of the ENCEL surveys).8 The resulting dataset contains detailed information
on the outcomes of children and socioeconomic characteristics of a panel of households that
reside within the evaluation localities.
The evaluation survey was intended to cover all inhabitants of the localities under study.
However, a small share of the population was not interviewed at baseline, and there were
8We have discarded the March 1998 and June 1999 rounds of the survey because we only have information
on the roll-out of the program at the end of each year.
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some changes in the village populations, so the total number of households observed in the
data is 24,077 in October 1997, 25,846 in October 1998, and 26,972 in November 1999.
Some attrition occurred, due in part to migration out of the villages, and in part to errors in
identification codes that occurred for a few enumerators: 8.4 percent of the 1997 households
cannot be followed and matched in all three rounds of the survey. Yet, this is unrelated to
the treatment assignment.
At baseline (October 1997), 60 percent of the households in evaluation localities were clas-
sified as eligible to receive program benefits. In this paper, we study the schooling decisions
of the children of those eligible households.9 Our main outcome of interest is school enroll-
ment, for which we also use the term “school participation” interchangeably. This answers
the question, Does the child currently attend school?, which tracks information regarding
both enrollment and overall attendance in school (but not regular attendance). Primary
school enrollment is almost universal in rural Mexico, while secondary school enrollment
is the most problematic area for school attainment. Also, secondary grade levels are where
Progresa has had its greatest impact among eligible children (Schultz 2004). We thus restrict
our attention to the enrollment decisions of children who, at baseline, are aged less than 18
and have either completed grades 5 or 6 of primary school or the first grade of secondary
school.10 We further reduce the number of observations in the data in order to generate a
balanced panel of children observed at all rounds.
The resulting sample contains 6,690 children who are making the transition from primary
to secondary school, remaining in secondary education or dropping out of school during the
academic years 1998–1999 and 1999–2000. For 807 (12.6 percent) of children, no information
was collected on either school participation or parental education, thereby leaving a final
sample of 5,883 children observed in both 1998 and 1999. At baseline, the average enrollment
rate is 63.8 percent (59.3 percent for girls and 68.5 percent for boys).
3 Program Externalities Across Villages
3.1 Empirical strategy
Our identification strategy exploits two features of the program evaluation design: the prox-
imity between many evaluation villages, and village-level random assignment to treatment.
9About 12 percent of the households were classified as non-poor at baseline but were later reclassified as
eligible. To avoid arbitrary classifications, we exclude those households from our analysis.
10The sample selection cannot be based on the grade during the follow-up period because that grade is
potentially a↵ected by the treatment.
10
The key intuition is that, after conditioning for the number of neighboring evaluation local-
ities, the parceling of those assigned to the treatment and control groups is random. This
enables us to identify the e↵ect on schooling decisions of the variations in treatment fre-
quency induced by the randomized evaluation within any neighborhood of an evaluation
village.
Neighborhoods are defined as concentric circles around each evaluation village using
geodesic distance d as the radius.11 Program treatment Tj is administered at the village
level. It is randomly assigned only within the subset of 506 villages which participated in
the evaluation of the program, and not all beneficiary villages participated in the evaluation.
Hence, as described in subsection 2.3, neighborhoods of evaluation villages are comprised
of other evaluation villages, non-evaluation beneficiary villages, and non-eligible villages.
Let then NBj,d,t = N
T
j,d,t + N
NE
j,d,t denote the total number of program beneficiary villages
situated within distance d from evaluation village j in a given post-treatment period t.
Among those, NTj,d,t is the number of evaluation villages which are randomly assigned to
the treatment group of the evaluation and NNEj,d,t is the number of other neighboring (non-
evaluation) villages which are targeted by the intervention during each post-treatment period
t. Now let NPj,d,t = N
T
j,d,t + N
C
j,d,t + N
NE
j,d,t denote the number of potential program villages
situated at distance d from village j in a given post-treatment period t, where we have
added NCj,d,t, to indicate the number of villages randomly assigned to the control group of
the evaluation.
To estimate the spillover e↵ect of the program on school participation, we use the follow-
ing linear regression model:
Yi,j,t = ↵1Tj + ↵2N
B
j,d,t + ↵3N
P
j,d,t + ↵
0
4Xi,j,d + ✏i,j,d,t, (1)
where Yi,j,t is a dummy indicating that program-eligible child i in evaluation village j in a
given post-treatment period t is going to school, Tj is the randomly assigned treatment indi-
cator which denotes whether or not locality j receives the program, Xi,j,d is a column-vector
of baseline characteristics at the individual, household, village and neighborhood levels, while
✏i,j,d,t captures other unobservable determinants of the school participation decision which
are potentially correlated with the targeting of the program.
In this framework, the parameter ↵1 captures the sum of the average direct e↵ect of
11Due to data limitation, we do not take into account the local geography (natural obstacles or communi-
cation axes such as mountains, rivers, or valleys) or transportation networks. This restriction may potentially
introduce some measurement error in neighborhood characteristics and generate some attenuation biases in
our estimates.
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program eligibility and the average indirect e↵ects which stem from treatment of other
households in the same village. Due to the fact that program treatment status varies at the
village level, it is not possible to separately identify these two e↵ects.12 The main parameter
of interest is ↵2, which captures the neighborhood-level spillovers stemming from the allo-
cation of treatment among the evaluation localities. Finally, the parameter ↵3 captures the
e↵ects of any unobserved determinant of the school participation decision that are correlated
with the program geographic targeting.
The identification challenge is that more marginalized regions tend to have higher treat-
ment densities (see Table 1) due to a variety of unobserved factors associated with the
geographic roll-out of the intervention, which are also likely to a↵ect program outcomes.
However, the random program assignment within the subset of evaluation villages provides
some exogenous variation in the local density of treatment in the geographic areas surround-
ing the evaluation villages, over and above the (endogenous) spillover e↵ects coming from the
non-evaluation beneficiary villages. After conditioning for the potential treatment frequency
in the neighborhood NPj,d,t, cross-neighborhood variations in the frequency of the program
are solely determined by the random allocation of neighboring evaluation villages to the
treatment and control groups. Indeed, the number of program beneficiary villages in the
neighborhood is given by the di↵erence between the number of potential beneficiary (or tar-
geted) villages and the number of villages selected into the control group for the randomized
evaluation: NBi,j,t = N
P
i,j,t NCi,j,t. Hence, because the number of villages allocated to the con-
trol (and treatment) group is random, the potential schooling outcomes of child i who reside
in time t in village j with program treatment status Tj = 0, 1 and neighborhood treatment
frequency NBd,t, are independent of that realized treatment frequency, when controlling for
targeted neighborhood treatment frequency NPd,t. Formally:
E[yT,N
B
i,j,t |NBj,d,t, NPj,d,t] = E[yT,N
B
i,j,t |NPj,d,t]. (2)
Under this conditional independence property, comparisons of average outcomes across dif-
ferent levels of actual treatment frequency NBi,j,t, e.g. n
B
1 and n
B
2 > n
B
1 , at a given level
of potential treatment frequency NPi,j,t, capture the causal e↵ect of an increase in actual
12A partial population approach, exploiting the presence of ineligible households in beneficiary villages,
can be followed, as it has been in previous studies. However, it requires some assumptions, notably that
spillovers a↵ect both eligible and ineligible individuals, and is thus not well-suited for investigating spillovers
on the take-up of program components.
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treatment frequency from nB1 to n
B
2 . Formally (and omitting the indexes):
E[yn
B
2 |NB = nB2 , NP ]  E[ynB1 |NB = nB1 , NP ] = E[ynB2 |NB = nB2 , NP ]  E[ynB1 |NB = nB2 , NP ]
= E[yn
B
2 |NP ]  E[ynB1 |NP ].
As a validation test of the property depicted in equation (2), we use data from the baseline
collected in October 1997 on children’s school participation, as well as the full set of covariates
that we employ in the empirical analysis, and estimate equation (1) using those baseline
characteristics as outcomes. This amounts to a test of the balancing of baseline covariates
with respect to the variation in local treatment frequency generated by the randomized
experiment. Table 2 reports the means and standard deviations for those variables (columns
1–2), along with the associated OLS coe cients of the neighborhood treatment density
term (NBj,d,t). In column 3, we display the unconditional marginal e↵ects which reveal the
presence of systematic di↵erences in observable characteristics across neighborhoods with
di↵erent degrees of program frequency. Consistent with the targeting design of the program,
treatment frequency correlates positively both with the level of deprivation in the centroid
village and with the density of villages/population in the neighborhood. However, as reported
in column 4, those di↵erences disappear once we control for the potential treatment frequency
in the neighborhood (NPj,t). An F-test of joint significance of all baseline characteristics does
not reject the null hypothesis that the entire set of variables is equal to zero (p-value=0.227)
with this specification.13
Our econometric model is thus a linear regression in which we are interested in the
parameter of a regressor, the density of actual program villages NBj,d,t, which is exogenous
once controlling for another regressor – the density of potential program villages NPj,d,t (note
that Tj is exogenous with or without any conditioning variable). As program targeting is
partly correlated with local poverty levels, we expect the estimated parameter of NPj,d,t to
be biased downward. However, the bias on that parameter is orthogonal to both the Tj and
NBj,d,t terms, and hence it does not contaminate the estimates of the ↵1 and ↵2 parameters.
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Furthermore, in equation (1), neighborhood treatment frequency is orthogonal to village-
level program treatment assignment so that the spillover e↵ect of the program can be identi-
fied for both treatment and control group villages. This feature of our empirical framework
13Two of the baseline variables (the share of eligible households and the number of secondary schools)
remain marginally statistically associated (at the 10 percent confidence level) with the density of the program.
Consistent with our main estimates, we estimate those placebo regressions by using a 5 km radius (d = 5).
Results (available upon request) are very similar when considering alternative radiuses.
14This statement is formally verified in Section B of the supplemental appendix.
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allows us to disentangle whether spatial externalities extend to the entire population or ex-
clusively a↵ect the outcomes of children and families who are included in the program. We
thus consider the following variant of equation (1):
Yi,j,t =  1Tj +  2N
B
j,d,t +  3[Tj ⇥NBj,d,t] +  4Npj,d,t +  5[Tj ⇥NPj,d,t] +Xi,j,d,t0 6 + ui,j,d,t, (3)
where the village-level treatment assignment term (Tj) interacts with the density of both
actual (NBj,d,t) and potential (N
P
j,d,t) neighboring beneficiary localities so that the e↵ects of
cross-village externalities are identified separately for the control and treatment groups. This
specification allows us to test whether or not program externalities di↵erentially vary with
treatment assignment ( 3 6= 0).
To be more explicit on the parameter we estimate, note that our model is equivalent to
one in which we are interested in the e↵ects of the neighboring evaluation villages assigned
to the treatment group, NTi,j,t, and we condition for the numbers of evaluation villages, N
E
i,j,t,
and non-evaluation beneficiary villages, NNEi,j,t . This model writes:
Yi,j,t = ↵1Tj + ↵2N
T
j,d,t + ↵3N
E
j,d,t + ↵4N
NE
j,d,t + ↵
0
5Xi,j,d + ✏i,j,d,t. (4)
The same conditional independence property that stems from the randomized allocation
into treatment of neighboring evaluation localities implies that NTi,j,t is random conditional
on NEj,d,t and N
NE
j,d,t, that is:
E[yT,N
T
i,j,t |NTj,d,t, NEj,d,t, NNEj,d,t] = E[yT,N
T
i,j,t |NEj,d,t, NNEj,d,t]. (5)
The ↵2 parameter in equations (1) and (4) capture the e↵ects of the same exogenous
variation in neighborhood treatment density (that is the spillover e↵ect of the experimental
treatment group villages) and the estimates obtained with these two models are the same.
In addition, we do not assume that the e↵ects of spillovers are linear. We can account
for non-linearities by using discrete variables indicating the specific numbers of neighboring
treatment villages, and use a flexible (or ’granular’) specification for the numbers of evalua-
tion or non-evaluation localities in the neighborhood. Below (see Section 3.2), we report the
estimates of equation (1) with one single parameter for the number of beneficiary villages,
as well as those of equation (4) with fully discretized controls for the numbers of experi-
mental treatment, evaluation and non-evaluation beneficiary localities.15 While the former
15Given the small number of experimental treatment localities within the neighborhoods in our sample
(see Table 1), we group them into two binary categorical variables according to the presence of one or two
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provides an average spillover e↵ect, the later specification allows us to check for the pres-
ence of non-linearities in the marginal e↵ects of neighboring evaluation localities assigned to
treatment.
Finally, several other features of the empirical specifications depicted above should be
noted. First, the parameter ↵2 in equation (1) is estimated out of the subset of eligible
households of the controlled experiment that have other evaluation villages in the neighbor-
hood of radius d. For a radius of 5 km, we have such identifying variation for 42 percent of
the evaluation villages.
Second, the inclusion of the vector of socio-demographic variables Xi,j,d in equations (1),
(3) and (4) is meant to increase the precision of the estimates. The control variables are
all measured at baseline using the 1997 data in order to avoid any endogeneity concern,
and taking advantage of the panel dimension of the data, include, in particular, baseline
school enrollment. The remaining control variables are as follows: child’s gender and age
(both in levels and squares); parental education; distance to the nearest city; the share of
eligible households; the presence of a secondary school in the locality; total population in the
locality; the number of localities; total population; and the mean degree of marginalization
in the neighborhood. We also include state and year fixed e↵ects.
Lastly, in order to account for the fact that evaluation villages may belong to multiple
neighborhoods, we cluster standard errors for groups of partially overlapping neighborhoods.
These groups are defined as sets of evaluation villages such that each village lies within the
radius-based neighborhood of another village of the set. Intuitively, as soon as an evaluation
village belongs to two radius-based neighborhoods, those two neighborhoods will belong
to the same cluster. This allows for correlations beyond single radiuses. In the empirical
analysis, our preferred specification uses a 5 km radius but we also use concentric radiuses
of 10 and 20 km. Considering a larger radius leads to a smaller number of clusters. In
particular, the 506 villages in the experiment belong to 358 clusters of partially overlapping 5
km neighborhoods – the 320 treatment villages belong to 249 such clusters – and this number
reduces to 180 when considering clusters formed by overlapping 10 km neighborhoods, and
45 with 20 km ones.
3.2 Main results
Tables 3 and 4 report the OLS estimates of the spillover e↵ects of the program on eligible
children’s school participation decisions. The estimates are obtained using the data for the
or more such localities (vis-a-vis zero) in the neighborhood.
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post-treatment period (October 1998 and November 1999).
The estimates in Table 3 correspond to the model in equation (1) with continuous vari-
ables for the numbers of beneficiary, NB, and potential beneficiaries, NP . The estimates are
obtained with two alternative measures of program frequency NB in the areas surrounding
the evaluation villages: the models in columns 1–3 use the numbers of villages treated in
a 5 km radius, while those in columns 4–6 instead use the numbers of eligible households
within the same radius. This second definition takes into account the variations in popula-
tion density across neighborhoods, and hence possibly better captures the extent of potential
interactions among program beneficiaries. We report and discuss only the estimates of the
parameters ↵1 and ↵2 but, as explained above, the regressions further include controls for
the numbers of potential beneficiaries, and for baseline characteristics observed in October
1997, notably baseline school enrollment.16
Column 1 of Table 3 reports the estimates for the baseline model in equation (1) when
measuring program frequency by the numbers of villages. It indicates that when considering
the entire sample of children in treatment and control villages, while living in a treated
community increases school participation by 9.7 percent, having an additional treated village
within a 5 km radius further increases enrollment rates by 2.9 percent (this spillover e↵ect is
statistically significant at the 10 percent level). The estimated own-village treatment e↵ect
of the program is in line with the results obtained in previous studies (e.g., Schultz (2004)).
In order to document the heterogeneity of cross-village externalities by treatment status,
column 2 of Table 3 reports OLS estimates of the augmented model specified in equation (3)
and column 3 estimates of the model in equation (1) obtained after restricting the sample
to the treatment group.17 Program externalities appear to matter only for children who
live in treatment group localities. Column 2 indeed shows no evidence of spillovers a↵ecting
school enrollment of children in control villages (the parameter for the main e↵ect of program
frequency has a negative point estimate and it is not statistically significant), but it does
show evidence of strong spillovers for the treatment group. The point estimate for the
di↵erential e↵ect of spillovers in treatment villages as compared to control villages (given
by the parameter for the interaction term  3 in equation 3) reaches 7.8 percent, and this
estimated di↵erential e↵ect is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.18 The finding of
16The last rows of Table 3 report the estimated coe cients of the conditioning term NP in equation (2),
split into its two components, NE and NNE . Those are, in general, negative and significant, suggesting the
presence of strong downward biases stemming from the process of geographic targeting of evaluation villages
and non-evaluation villages.
17We also ran probit estimates of the same models and obtained very similar estimates of the e↵ects of
spillovers – the results are available upon request.
18Note that when we allow for heterogenous e↵ects of program spillovers, the relative OLS coe cient of
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spillovers restricted to the control group is confirmed by the estimates reported in column 3,
in which we restrict the sample to the treatment group. The e↵ect on school enrollment of
having an additional treated village within a 5 km radius is estimated at 5.6 percent, and it
is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The specifications reported in columns 4-6
of Table 3 which use the numbers of households, normalized by 100, for measuring program
frequency in the areas surrounding the evaluation villages give very similar results to the
corresponding ones in columns 1-3.
Table 4 reports the estimates for the model in equation (4); the e↵ects of program fre-
quency are captured directly by the number of treatment group villages NT , which, as dis-
cussed above, is the source of variation in local treatment frequency that serves to identify
spillovers in all our specifications. We use two indicator variables that indicate the presence
of one or two or more treatment group villages in the neighborhood. These estimates also
incorporate fully discrete controls for the numbers evaluation and non-evaluation beneficiary
villages. We report and discuss the estimates of the parameters ↵1, ↵2, but also of ↵3 for the
main conditioning variable, which is the number of evaluation localities in the neighborhood.
The regressions further include indicator variables for each non-evaluation beneficiary village
and total numbers of villages (we do not report the corresponding parameter estimates, as
these numbers can be very large), as well as for baseline characteristics observed in October
1997, notably baseline school enrollment. Figure 2 shows the visual representation of the
estimates of the average spillover e↵ects reported in column 1 of Table 4. They indicate that
a treatment group village in the neighborhood increases school participation by 6.1 percent,
while two or more neighboring treatment group villages increase it by 8.0 percent. These
estimates show that spatial spillovers do not increase linearly with the number of treated
villages in the neighborhood. The point estimates reported in column 2 for the di↵eren-
tial e↵ect of spillovers in treatment villages as compared to control villages are larger in
magnitude, but reveal a similar pattern.19
the village-level treatment assignment term ( 1) decreases only slightly (to 8.1 percent). We argue that this
is due to the simultaneous presence of non-evaluation treated neighboring villages together with the fact
that program spillovers accrue exclusively between beneficiaries. With this view, the estimated own-village
e↵ect of the program on school enrollment would also embed a portion of the program spillovers stemming
from the non-evaluation treated neighbors.
19This non-linear shape of the spillover e↵ects with respect to the frequency of nearby program bene-
ficiaries can be related to a broad class of models of discrete decisions with strategic complementarities,
and/or the presence of threshold e↵ects in the spillover function – see, e.g., Brock & Durlauf (2001), Glaeser
& Scheinkman (2000). These cross-villages e↵ects are of the same magnitude or slightly higher than the
ones that have been documented for the e↵ects of program spillovers within-villages (from beneficiaries to
non-beneficiaries) in the same setting, that is around 5 percent (Bobonis & Finan 2009, Lalive & Cattaneo
2009).
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3.3 Further evidence
To investigate whether spillovers operate over relatively short or larger distances, Table 5
reports the OLS estimates of the model in equation (1) using measures of program frequency
in neighborhoods covering larger distances over and above those of program frequency in the
0-5 km radius. As in Table 3, we use the number of villages (columns 1–4) and eligible
households (columns 5–8) as two alternative measures of program frequency. Columns 1 and
5 use the same baseline specification as columns 1 and 4 of Table 3 with the entire sample.
Columns 2 and 6 use the restricted sample of children in treated villages (as do columns 3
and 6 of Table 3). For the estimates in columns 3, 4, 7 and 8, we measure program frequency
over a 20 km radius and weight the observations in each village by the inverse of the distance
to the centroid.
The estimated coe cients for the numbers of treated villages located at a distance be-
tween 5 and 10 km are small and statistically insignificant, whereas the corresponding esti-
mates at a distance between 0 and 5 km barely change with respect to those presented in
Table 3. This suggests the presence of a strong decay rate in spatial externalities. How-
ever, the specifications using the distance-weighted density measures computed over the 20
km radius confirm the presence of positive spillovers on school participation in treatment
group localities. Overall, these results indicate that spillovers operate over relatively short
distances. Since we find no evidence of spillovers of beneficiaries over larger distances, in the
rest of the analysis we focus on those operating over 0 to 5 km.
As a robustness check, we consider an alternative specification that instruments the ac-
tual treatment frequency in the neighborhood with the randomized treatment frequency.
However, if we control for both the number of evaluation localities and non-evaluation ben-
eficiary localities, the first stage becomes evidently mechanical with an additional treatment
locality increasing by one the number of beneficiary localities in the neighborhood. In order
to avoid such a mechanical first-stage relationship, we remove from the specification the
variable corresponding to the number of non-evaluation program villages (NNE). Note that
we still have to control for the number of neighboring evaluation villages (NE) in order to
account for the fact that the identifying variation is non-zero for 42 percent of the evaluation
villages (i.e. those that have at least another evaluation village in their radius 0-5 km), and
in order to assure that the exclusion restriction is valid (because of the correlation across
village neighborhoods between NE and NNE).
The corresponding estimation results are reported in Table 6. The point estimate of the
first-stage parameter for the e↵ect of an additional treatment group village on neighborhood
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treatment density is estimated at 1.43 (column 1). The corresponding t-statistic is 1.97 and
the F test of the excluded instrument is 3.9, which is statistically significant at the 5 percent
level. The reduced form coe cient for the e↵ect of the number of treated villages in the
0–5 km radius on secondary school enrollment is 0.028 (column 2), which is very much in
line with the corresponding estimate reported in column 1 of Table 3. Column 3 reports the
IV estimate of the relationship between the frequency of neighboring program localities and
secondary school enrollment, which is positive but not significantly di↵erent from zero. The
IV point estimate has a smaller magnitude than the OLS one reported in column 2, which
reflects the larger-than-one first-stage relationship, and is estimated with more noise due to
the reduced statistical power in this specification.
As a last robustness exercise, we consider alternative measures of program take-up based
on the health component of the program. We use household-level information from the post-
program survey round of October 1998 on the uptake of three screening tests that form part
of the health requirements of the Progresa program: hypertension (blood pressure test), dia-
betes (blood sugar test) and cervical cancer (via the PAP smear test).20 Table 7 reports the
OLS estimates of both own-village treatment e↵ects and the spatial spillover e↵ects stem-
ming from neighboring program villages on the probability that the households in the sample
comply with the health conditionality of the program. The estimates reveal the presence of
a strong e↵ect of the program on the probability that eligible households comply with its
health requirements, as confirmed by the positive and large marginal e↵ects associated with
the variable indicating whether or not the own village of residence of the households in the
sample received the program.21 The estimated coe cients of cross-village externalities are
reported in columns 1, 3 and 5 of Table 7. These are also positive but not significantly dif-
ferent from zero – with the exception of the specification using the uptake of the blood sugar
test as dependent variable (column 3), which features an estimated externalities coe cient
that is significant at the 10 percent level.
We next estimate the heterogenous e↵ect model reported in equation (3). The corre-
sponding estimates are reported in columns 2, 4 and 6 of Table 7. Externalities coe cients
20The household respondents were asked whether or not any household member had been screened for
these conditions in the previous six months. In order to maintain full comparability with the estimates of
program spillover reported in the paper, we estimate at the household-level the linear model reported in
equation (1) in the paper on the same sample that we consider in the main empirical analysis. Results
(available upon request) are very similar in both magnitude and precision, if we instead consider the larger
sample of all program-eligible households in October 1998.
21As we note in Section 3.1, the fact that program treatment status varies at the village level implies that
such estimates capture both the direct e↵ect of the program as well as the average indirect e↵ects which
stem from the treatment of other individuals in the same village.
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for households residing in treated villages are more precisely estimated and larger in magni-
tude when compared to their average counterparts (except for the PAP smear test), whereas
those for control villages cannot be distinguished from zero. An additional neighboring pro-
gram village increases compliance with health screening by roughly 10 percent for households
who reside in a program village, or about half of the “own-village” treatment e↵ect and a 20-
30 percent increase vis-a-vis the corresponding mean in the control group. These estimates
of health spillovers are broadly consistent with those of the enrollment spillovers reported in
Table 3, both in terms of incidence (they accrue exclusively among program participants)
and of the magnitude. They are slightly more imprecise though, possibly due to the smaller
sample size resulting from household-level regressions and one year of program follow-up
data.
4 Mechanisms
We now use additional information gathered from both program operational surveys and
administrative sources in order to shed some light on the interpretation behind the patterns
uncovered in Section 3. The finding of spillovers on school enrollment operating over short
distances supports a simple model of peer e↵ects on program take-up decisions of eligible
households.22 As we do not have measures of the occurrences of interactions of beneficiaries
from di↵erent neighboring villages, we cannot report direct evidence of this. Hence, we
conduct several indirect checks for the presence of such interactions. On the other hand,
some spatial variations in the local implementation of the program could also a priori explain
the observed relationship between the local density of the treatment and program impacts.
We thus also test for the presence of such spatial variations in the implementation of the
intervention under study.
4.1 Knowledge spillovers among program participants
In spite of the emphasis placed on informing the potential participants about the objectives,
design and requirements of the intervention, concerns have been expressed by those involved
in the initial phases of the implementation regarding the e↵ectiveness of the di↵usion of
information about the program among targeted households (Adato et al. 2000). To further
22Non-market interactions may a↵ect take-up decisions through two channels: information and social
norms. While conceptually di↵erent, these two forms of social behaviors can hardly be distinguished empir-
ically. We thus broadly refer to the influence of others on individual responses as peer e↵ects.
20
corroborate this anecdotal evidence, we use information from an operational follow-up survey
conducted among eligible households in the evaluation treatment-group villages in May 1999
(i.e., 14 months after the inception of the program). Program beneficiaries were asked to
identify three sets of benefits distributed by Progresa: (i) scholarships and school supplies,
(ii) food stipends and nutritional supplements, and (iii) preventive health care and health
check-ups. Most of the respondents who were to receive the transfers were mothers. While
98 percent of the respondents were able to spontaneously and correctly mention the nutrition
component, only 60 percent correctly identified both the health and education components.
Knowledge of the program components was thus incomplete in treatment villages at that
time.
In such a context of sparse and coarse knowledge about the benefits of the intervention,
information-sharing among potential beneficiaries is likely to have played a role, notably
among the women who are the primary recipients of the transfers and regularly encounter
each other during program operations. When asked, in the same operational follow-up survey,
to mention the most significant changes within their communities, half of the beneficiaries
reported that the program had increased the degree of cooperation among women.
For further evidence on this, we estimate the e↵ects of spatial spillovers on those mea-
sures of eligible households’ knowledge of the di↵erent program components. Table 5 re-
ports the estimates, which are obtained using the model in equation (1) estimated at the
household-level using the October 1998 data. Having one additional neighboring program
village increases by 4.5 and 8.2 percent respectively, the share of eligible households that are
aware of the education and health components (columns 1 and 2), and has a smaller and no
significant e↵ect on the share of households aware of the nutritional component (column 3).
Given the evidence of program externalities on school participation decisions presented in
Section 3, the observed variations of the knowledge of the education component could reflect
increases in school attendance rather than the presence of peer e↵ect among potential bene-
ficiaries. Yet, the take-up patterns of the program discussed in Section 2.2 make it di cult
to interpret the evidence of the knowledge indicators of other program components (such
as health benefits), as purely stemming from corresponding variations in school enrollment
among program-eligible children.
4.2 Supply-side e↵ects
Areas with higher densities of program participants may have benefited from more e cient
program operations, or from improvements in the supply of education or health services,
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thereby helping some eligible households to comply with the schooling requirements of the
program. A related alternative explanation is that the implementation of the program may
have been more e cient when the number of evaluation treatment group villages in the
neighborhood (rather than the total number of beneficiaries) was higher. While both notions
of implementation scale gains seem a priori reasonable, we argue that they are unlikely to
explain our results.
To examine the presence of di↵erences in implementation and supply, two preliminary
points should be noted. First, any variation in program delivery in a given geographic
area should evenly benefit those program recipients who reside within it. This is at odds
with the evidence reported in column 1 of Table 5, that program spillovers appear spatially
concentrated within relatively small areas surrounding the evaluation villages. According to
this line of thought, school supply-side changes would likely a↵ect the enrollment decisions
of both recipients and non-recipients, an idea di cult to reconcile with the evidence of
heterogeneous externalities reported in column 2 of Table 3.
Second, we identify spatial spillovers using only the variation in program frequency gen-
erated by the randomized experiment. This variation is small compared to the overall scale
of the program (as seen in Table 1, in a given 5 km radius, there are on average 10 beneficiary
villages but only 0.6 evaluation villages, among which 0.4 are assigned to the treatment group
and 0.2 to the control group). Program frequency is thus not much di↵erent in neighborhoods
that have more treatment-group villages compared to those that have more control-group
villages, and the resulting infra-marginal changes in the scale of the program are unlikely to
trigger any supply-side e ciency gain.
We next run a battery of complementary tests aimed at detecting the presence of supply-
side responses associated with experimental variations in the frequency of the treatment in
the areas surrounding evaluation villages. We begin with two measures of implementation
e ciency at the village-level. According to qualitative interviews with beneficiaries, local
program sta↵, school teachers and health sta↵ (see Adato et al. 2000), one major source
of ine ciency in program delivery was the delays in the delivery of the form for school
attendance monitoring (E1 form), and the associated delays in the payment of scholarships.
First, we use program administrative data on the monetary transfers (for scholarships and
school supplies) delivered to eligible households to compute the number of months from
incorporation until the first disbursements were made to the beneficiary households in treated
villages.23 Second, we use information from the operational follow-up survey in order to
23While food stipends were distributed to all villages assigned to the treatment group at the same time in
March 1998, only 56 percent of the those localities received the first scholarship transfer in March 1998; 36
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construct the share of program recipients in treated villages that received the E1 form as of
May 1999.
In order to maintain full comparability with the estimates of program spillover reported
in the rest of the paper, we estimate at the village-level the linear model reported in equation
(1), using those program implementation measures as dependent variables on the sample of
treated villages that we consider in the main empirical analysis.24 The dependent variables
are time-invariant, and hence we match this information with only the first round (1998)
of the data of the program roll-out. As documented in columns 1–3 of Table 9, these three
measures of e ciency of program implementation are unrelated to the frequency of the
treatment in the areas surrounding evaluation villages.
We next use the yearly secondary school census in order to construct school supply
aggregate measures for the 358 evaluation neighborhoods in our sample (with both treated
and control villages as centroid), and estimate at the neighborhood-level the linear model
reported in equation (1) over the two years of the program roll-out (1998-1999). In all
specifications, we control for the baseline (1997) value of the dependent variable. The OLS
estimates are reported in panel B of Table 9, which are very small in magnitude and not
statistically di↵erent from zero.
5 Conclusion
We examined, in the context of the Progresa-Oportunidades conditional cash transfer pro-
gram, whether or not the take-up of the schooling component of the program is influenced
by the presence of other beneficiaries in areas comprising several villages. We found evidence
of positive spillovers within networks of beneficiaries spanning those areas. A higher local
frequency of program beneficiaries increases the take-up of the scholarships for secondary
schooling o↵ered by the program and, accordingly, school enrollment at that level. In con-
trast, these e↵ects do not a↵ect the schooling decisions of households in the control group
villages that were not yet incorporated into the program.
percent received them two months later, and the remaining 8 percent six months or more after incorporation
into the program. These administrative delays appear concentrated in some regions, notably in the states
of Queretaro and San Luis Potosi. As a further check, we have re-estimated equation (1) without those two
states. Results (available upon request) are very similar to those reported in Table 3
24Results (available upon request) barely change when we consider instead the entire sample of 320 treated
villages. Due to a few missing values in the additional data sources that we employ, we lose some village-level
observations in the regressions displayed in panel A of Table 2: three villages for scholarship disbursements,
four villages for school supply disbursements and seven villages for the receipt of the school attendance (E1)
form.
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To better understand our findings, we tested and found suggestive evidence for the pres-
ence of knowledge spillovers among program-eligible households. While we could not directly
test for the presence of social interactions, we found that higher treatment densities in the
neighborhoods were associated with increased knowledge among eligible households of the
schooling and health components of the program. We also tested the alternative hypothesis
that the spillover e↵ect that we estimate instead reflects heterogeneities in direct treatment
impacts due to spatial variations in the implementation of the program. The evidence we
obtained is not consistent with this interpretation of our findings.
Spillover e↵ects on program take-up have implications for the design and implementation
of social policies in developing countries. The magnitude of the estimated e↵ect suggests
that there can be large gains from the spatial concentration of the target population of an
intervention, as local networks of potential beneficiaries can act as social multipliers in the
take-up of the proposed benefits. Spillover e↵ects also have implications for the evaluation
of social policy interventions, notably in settings where a program is implemented over an
extended area and treatment frequency is high. In particular, capturing those e↵ects across
villages, so as to recover impact evaluation parameters that incorporate spillovers, requires
the analysis of the impacts of the program at the level of relatively large geographical areas
or clusters. The feasibility of this option critically hinges upon the scale of the program
that is being evaluated, and statistical power reasons may push the researcher to opt for
a narrower definition of the evaluation clusters. These considerations can be particularly
important for policy interventions that are evaluated at scale, a setting which likely di↵ers
from the evaluation of small pilot programs.
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! Other program locality 1999
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Note: This figure reports the geographic locations of the villages targeted by the program during the
period 1998-1999 in the seven central states of Mexico in which the evaluation of the program took place.
The quadrant in the upper right hand corner displays a close-up view of a region in the state of Michoacan
in which the size of the markers has been adjusted for the relative population size, and 5 km radiuses are
displayed around each evaluation village.
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Figure 2: Marginal Spillover E↵ects - Granular Specification
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Note: This figure depicts the OLS coe cients and the associated 95 percent confidence intervals on school
participation decisions of the own village treatment term, along with those for the indicator variables for
having one and two or more neighboring treated villages, respectively. The full set of estimated coe cients
of equation (4) is reported in Table 4. The sample contains program-eligible children in evaluation villages,
observed in October 1998 and November 1999, who, at baseline, are aged less than 18 and have completed
grades 5 or 6 of primary school and the first grade of secondary school. Standard errors are clustered at
the level of groupings of partially overlapping neighborhoods. All specifications control for baseline school
enrollment.
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Table 1: Treatment Frequency in Neighborhood Around Evaluation Villages
Neighborhood Poverty Treat Assignment
Sample All Low High Treat Control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Numbers of beneficiaries in neighborhood
# Beneficiary villages 10.0 6.66 13.3 10.2 9.64
(8.13) (5.07) (9.19) (8.20) (8.04)
# Children in beneficiary villages 834 565 1104 831 841
(864) (641) (968) (839) (908)
# Scholarship recipients 386 252 520 385 386
(402) (283) (455) (385) (430)
Distribution of evaluation villages in neighborhood
# Evaluation villages 0.62 0.44 0.80 0.63 0.61
(0.92) (0.68) (1.08) (0.94) (0.87)
Prob(1 evaluation village) 0.27 0.24 0.31 0.28 0.26
(0.45) (0.43) (0.46) (0.45) (0.44)
Prob(2 evaluation villages) 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.12
(0.32) (0.29) (0.34) (0.31) (0.33)
Prob(3+ evaluation villages) 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.03
(0.17) (0.06) (0.24) (0.17) (0.18)
Distribution of evaluation villages assigned to treatment in neighborhood
# Treated villages 0.40 0.27 0.53 0.40 0.39
(0.71) (0.52) (0.84) (0.74) (0.65)
Prob(1 treated village) 0.24 0.19 0.28 0.24 0.25
(0.43) (0.43) (0.40) (0.42) (0.43)
Prob(2+ treated villages) 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.06
(0.25) (0.19) (0.29) (0.25) (0.25)
Total Villages in Evaluation Sample 506 253 253 320 186
Note: This table reports means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for the numbers of neighboring
beneficiary villages, children (aged 6-14) in those villages and scholarship recipients, and the mean
numbers and distribution of neighboring evaluation and treatment group villages within areas delimited
by 5 km radius around evaluation localities. Source: Progresa October 1998 evaluation survey. The
sample in column 1 contains all evaluation localities. In columns 2-3, we split the sample of evaluation
localities according to the median of the mean index of marginalization in the neighborhood. In columns
4-5, we split the sample according to the program treatment assignment indicator of the village situated
in the centroid of each neighborhood.
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Table 2: Neighborhood Treatment Frequency and Baseline Characteristics
Mean Std. Dev. OLS Coe↵ (std.err) of NBj,5 Term
Unconditional Conditional on NPj,5
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individual and HH Characteristics (N=11,766)
School Enrollment 0.68 0.47 0.000 0.018
(0.001) (0.024)
Age 14.31 1.91 0.005 0.045
(0.003)* (0.076)
Female 0.49 0.50 -0.001 0.006
(0.001) (0.014)
Mother Education (years) 2.30 2.27 -0.015 -0.001
(0.008)* (0.164)
Centroid Village Characteristics (N=11,766)
Share of Program Eligible HHs 0.59 0.19 0.007 0.054
(0.001)*** (0.020)**
Secondary School (dummy) 0.25 0.44 -0.007 -0.013
(0.003)** (0.069)
Distance to Nearest City 104.37 42.91 0.129 2.901
(0.298) (5.662)
Neighborhood (radius=5km) Characteristics (N=11,766)
Number of Secondary Schools 3.03 2.08 0.092 -0.528
(0.019)*** (0.274)*
Mean Index of Marginalization 4.38 0.73 0.029 0.041
(0.004)*** (0.066)
Number of Villages 22.76 12.90 1.125 -0.119
(0.059)*** (1.041)
Population Density (thous) 7.13 9.33 0.425 -0.984
(0.077)*** (0.999)
F-Test of Joint Orthogonality 49.90 1.274
P-values (0.000) (0.227)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Notes: This table reports means and standard deviations (columns 1-2) of the school participation
(enrollment) outcome at baseline (October 1997), as well as the full set of covariates we employ in
the empirical analysis. In columns 3-4, we display the OLS coe cient of the neighborhood treatment
frequency term (NBj,5) on each of those baseline characteristics, respectively, without and with its potential
counterpart (NPj,5) as a conditioning term. Standard errors clustered at the level of groupings of partially
overlapping neighborhoods are reported in parenthesis below each OLS coe cients. Source: Progresa
1997 targeting and baseline survey and geo-referenced list of beneficiary localities. The sample contains
program-eligible children in evaluation villages, observed in October 1998 and November 1999, who, at
baseline, are aged less than 18 and have completed grades 5 or 6 of primary school and the first grade of
secondary school.
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Table 3: Spatial Spillovers of the Program on Secondary School Enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Own Village Treated 0.097*** 0.081*** 0.095*** 0.081***
(0.014) (0.025) (0.014) (0.023)
Actual Treatment Frequency Villages Eligible households (x100)
# Treated in 0-5km 0.029* -0.020 0.056*** 0.039 -0.026 0.070**
(0.015) (0.023) (0.020) (0.024) (0.042) (0.035)
(# Treated in 0-5km)⇥Treat 0.078** 0.10*
(0.033) (0.056)
Potential Treatment Frequency Villages Eligible households (x100)
# Evaluation in 0-5km -0.020 0.013 -0.047** -0.017 0.038 -0.050
(0.014) (0.021) (0.020) (0.024) (0.038) (-.037)
(# Evaluation in 0-5km)⇥Treat -0.055* -0.083
(0.030) (0.056)
# Non-Eval in 0-5km -0.031** 0.017 -0.058*** -0.039 0.026 -0.069*
(0.015) (0.023) (0.020) (0.024) (0.042) (0.035)
(# Non-Eval in 0-5km)⇥Treat -0.077** -0.097*
(0.033) (0.057)
Number of Observations 11766 11766 7317 11766 11766 7317
R-squared 0.364 0.365 0.383 0.364 0.365 0.382
Number of Clusters 358 358 249 358 358 249
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates of cross-village program spillovers on school participation decisions following
the specifications in equations (1) and (3). The dependent variable equals 1 if the child currently attends school.
Columns 1-3 use the numbers of villages treated in a 5 km radius as a measure of treatment frequency. Columns
4-6 use the corresponding numbers of households over the same radius. Parameters are reported for the number of
evaluation and non-evaluation potential beneficiary villages (columns 1-3) and households (columns 4-6) within the
radius controls. Other controls include: baseline school enrollment; child’s gender; age and age squared; parental
education; distance to the nearest city; the share of eligible households; the presence of a secondary school in the
locality; total population, the number of secondary schools; the mean degree of marginalization in the radius; state
dummies; and a dummy for year 1998. Standard errors are clustered at the level of groupings of partially overlapping
neighborhoods are reported in parentheses. Source: Progresa evaluation surveys and geo-referenced census of localities
and secondary schools. The sample contains program-eligible children in evaluation villages, observed in October
1998 and November 1999, who, at baseline, are aged less than 18 and have completed grades 5 or 6 of primary school
and the first grade of secondary school. It is restricted to treatment villages in columns 3 and 6.
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Table 4: Granular Model of Spatial Spillovers
(1) (2)
Own village treated 0.091*** 0.121***
(0.013) (0.018)
1 treated village in 0-5km 0.061*** -0.016
(0.022) (0.030)
2 or more treated villages in 0-5km 0.080** -0.009
(0.033) (0.044)
(1 treated village in 0-5km)⇥Treat 0.105**
(0.044)
(2 or more treated villages in 0-5km)⇥Treat 0.153**
(0.065)
1 evaluation village in 0-5km -0.053** 0.074***
(0.023) (0.028)
2 evaluation villages in 0-5km -0.082** -0.001
(0.032) (0.037)
3 evaluation villages in 0-5km 0.066 0.122*
(0.043) (0.064)
4 evaluation villages in 0-5km -0.065 0.151
(0.111) (0.111)
5 evaluation villages in 0-5km -0.050 -0.058
(0.048) (0.069)
6 evaluation villages in 0-5km -0.021 -0.107
(0.056) (0.065)
dummies for # non-evaluation villages Yes Yes
dummies for # villages dummies Yes Yes
Number of Observations 11766 11766
R-squared 0.385 0.388
Number of Clusters 358 358
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates of cross-village program spillovers
on school participation decisions using a ’granular’, or fully discretized, speci-
fication of equation (4). The dependent variable equals 1 if the child currently
attends school. The measures of treatment are the numbers of evaluation
villages allocated to treatment within 5 km (1 or 2 or more), and controls
include indicating variables for the fully discretized numbers of evaluation
villages, non-evaluation beneficiary villages and total number of villages in
a 5 km radius. Controls are also included for child’s school enrollment at
baseline, gender, age and age squared, parental education, distance to the
nearest city, the share of eligible households and the presence of a secondary
school in the locality; total population, the number of localities, the number
of secondary schools and the mean degree of marginalization in the radius;
state dummies and a dummy for year 1998. Standard errors are clustered
at the level of groupings of partially overlapping neighborhoods are reported
in parentheses. Source: Progresa evaluation surveys and geo-referenced cen-
sus of localities and secondary schools. The sample contains program-eligible
children in evaluation villages, observed in October 1998 and November 1999,
who, at baseline, are aged less than 18 and have completed grades 5 or 6 of
primary school and the first grade of secondary school.
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Table 5: Specification Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Own Village Treated 0.094*** 0.096*** 0.092*** 0.094***
(0.016) (0.009) (0.015) (0.010)
Actual Treatment Frequency Villages Eligible households (x100)
# treated in 0-5km 0.025* 0.062*** 0.040* 0.078**
(0.015) (0.020) (0.021) (0.036)
# treated in 5-10km -0.0058 0.014 -0.004 0.008
(0.016) (0.015) (0.019) (0.020)
# treated distance-weighted 0.029 0.087** 0.032 0.110**
(0.025) (0.042) (0.026) (0.043)
Number of Obs 11766 7317 11766 7317 11766 7317 11766 7317
R-squared 0.364 0.384 0.365 0.381 0.365 0.384 0.365 0.380
Number of Clusters 180 137 45 36 180 137 45 36
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates of cross-village program spillovers on school participation decisions following the
specifications in equations (1) and (3). The dependent variable equals 1 if the child currently attends school. As measures of
treatment, columns 1-4 use the numbers of villages treated, respectively within 5 km, 10 km, and 20 km with distance weights,
while columns 5-8 use the numbers of eligible households respectively within 5 km, 10 km, and 20 km with distance weights.
Standard errors are clustered at the level of groupings of partially overlapping neighborhoods are reported in parentheses.
Control variables include: baseline school enrollment; the numbers of potential beneficiary villages (columns 1-4) or eligible
households (columns 5-8); child’s gender age and age squared; parental education; distance to the nearest city; the share of
eligible households; the presence of a secondary school in the locality; total population; the number of localities; the number
of secondary schools; the mean degree of marginalization in the radius; state dummies and a dummy for year 1998. Source:
Progresa evaluation surveys and geo-referenced census of localities and secondary schools. The sample contains program-eligible
children in evaluation villages, observed in October 1998 and November 1999, who, at baseline, are aged less than 18 and have
completed grades 5 or 6 of primary school and the first grade of secondary school.
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Table 6: Spatial Spillovers of Progresa on Secondary School Enrollment: IV Estimates
Dependent Variable Treatment intensity School Enrollment School Enrollment
Estimator OLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3)
Randomized Treatment Frequency 1.436** 0.028*
(0-5km) (0.729) (0.016)
Actual Treatment Frequency 0.019
(0-5km) (0.018)
Own Village Treated 1.078** 0.096*** 0.075***
(0.526) (0.014) (0.023)
Weak identification tests:
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic 3.87
Prob > F (1, 79) 0.0498
Mean Dependent Variable 11.807 0.582
Number of Observations 11766 11766 11766
R-squared 0.707 0.364 0.319
Number of Clusters 358 358 358
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Note: This Table reports OLS and 2SLS estimates of cross-village spillovers on school enrollment decisions. The
dependent variable equals 1 if the child currently attends school. All specifications include the treatment assignment
indicator at the locality-level and the number of evaluation villages in the neighborhood, and baseline school enroll-
ment. The other control variables include: child’s gender age and age squared; parental education; distance to the
nearest city; the share of eligible households; the presence of a secondary school in the locality; total population,
the number of localities, the number of secondary schools; the mean degree of marginalization in the radius; state
dummies and a dummy for year 1998. Standard errors clustered at the level of groupings of partially overlapping
neighborhoods are reported in parentheses. Source: Progresa evaluation surveys and geo-referenced census of locali-
ties and secondary schools. The sample contains program-eligible children in the Progresa evaluation localities with
at least another evaluation locality in their close proximity (5 km), observed in October 1998 and November 1999,
who, at baseline, are aged less than 18 and have completed grades 5 or 6 of primary school and the first grade of
secondary school.
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Table 7: Spatial Spillovers of Progresa on the Uptake of the Health Screening Tests
Chronic Disease Hypertension Diabetes Cervical Cancer
Screening Test Blood Pressure Blood Sugar PAP smear
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Own Village Treated 0.205*** 0.241*** 0.162*** 0.192*** 0.134*** 0.204***
(0.021) (0.032) (0.024) (0.039) (0.023) (0.038)
# Treated Villages in 0-5km 0.039 -0.031 0.058* -0.017 0.033 0.008
(0.032) (0.042) (0.032) (0.043) (0.031) (0.027)
# Treated Villages in 0-5km ⇥ Treat 0.114** 0.123** 0.044
(0.053) (0.056) (0.046)
Mean of Dep. Var. in Control Group 0.374 0.298 0.252
Number of Observations 4522 4522 4523 4523 4522 4522
R-squared 0.102 0.108 0.073 0.078 0.091 0.094
Number of Clusters 358 358 358 358 358 358
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Note: This Table reports OLS estimates of cross-village spillovers on the likelihood of compliance with three screening
tests that form part to the health requirements of the Progresa program following the specification in equation (1). The
dependent variables equals 1 if at least one household member reports having being screened in the previous six months
for the corresponding chronic condition. Standard errors clustered at the level of groupings of partially overlapping
neighborhoods are reported in parentheses. All specifications control for baseline school enrollment. The other control
variables include: the potential number of beneficiary villages; parental education; distance to the nearest city; the share
of eligible households; the presence of a secondary school in the locality; total population, the number of localities; the
number of secondary schools; the mean degree of marginalization in the radius, and state dummies. Source: Progresa
evaluation surveys and geo-referenced census of localities and secondary schools. The sample contains program-eligible
households residing in Progresa evaluation villages observed in October 1998 whose children, at baseline, are aged less
than 18 and have completed grades 5 or 6 of primary school and the first grade of secondary school.
35
Table 8: Knowledge About the Program Components
Scholarship Health Nutrition
(1) (2) (3)
# Treated Villages 0-5km 0.045** 0.082*** 0.011
(0.022) (0.029) (0.007)
Baseline enrollment Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 3858 3858 3858
R-squared 0.073 0.053 0.026
Number of Clusters 242 242 242
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates of cross-village external-
ities on dichotomous indicators of whether or not recipients know
the various components of the benefits package of the program fol-
lowing the specification in equation (1). Standard errors clustered
at the level of groupings of partially overlapping neighborhoods are
reported in parentheses. The following baseline control variables are
included in each specification: the potential number of beneficiary
villages within 5 km; child’s gender age and age squared; parental ed-
ucation; distance to the nearest city; the share of eligible households;
the presence of a secondary school in the locality; total population;
the number of localities; the number of secondary schools; the mean
degree of marginalization in the radius; state dummies and a dummy
for year 1998. Source: Progresa evaluation surveys, geo-referenced
census of localities and secondary schools, and Progresa follow-up
survey of recipients. The sample contains program-eligible house-
holds residing in treated villages observed in October 1998 whose
children, at baseline, are aged less than 18 and have completed grades
5 or 6 of primary school and the first grade of secondary school.
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Table 9: Supply-Side Responses
Panel A: Indicators of E ciency of Program Delivery at the Village Level (centroid)
Dependent Variable Months of Delays in Monetary Transfers Share of HHs who
Scholarships School Supplies Received of E1 Form
(1) (2) (3)
# Villages treated in 0-5km -0.007 -0.043 0.001
(0.140) (0.132) (0.024)
Village controls Yes Yes Yes
Neighborhood controls Yes Yes Yes
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Mean of Dep. Var. 1.1 6.4 .56
Number of Observations 306 305 302
R-squared 0.343 0.111 0.080
Number of Clusters 247 246 243
Panel B: Aggregate School Characteristics at the Neighborhood Level (0-5km)
Number of Number of Share of
Schools Teachers High Ed. Teachers
(1) (2) (3)
# Villages treated in 0-5km 0.045 -1.121 -0.030
(0.080) (0.767) (0.022)
Baseline Value of Dep. Var. Yes Yes Yes
Neighborhood Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummy (1998) Yes Yes Yes
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Mean of Dep. Var. 3 15 .2
Number of Observations 716 716 716
R-squared 0.953 0.968 0.589
Number of Clusters 358 358 358
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates of the e↵ects of local treatment frequency on measures of the pro-
gram’s supply-side. Standard errors clustered at the level of groupings of partially overlapping neighborhoods
are reported in parentheses. Source: geo-referenced census of localities and secondary schools, and Progresa
follow-up survey of recipients. The treated villages observed in 1998 are in Panel A and the evaluation neigh-
borhoods observed in both 1998 and 1999 are in Panel B.
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Web Appendix - Not for Publication
A Randomness of the Evaluation Sample
We hereby provide the english translation for a few extracts of an o cial document from the
original evaluation of the program (Progresa, 1997), which clearly suggest that the evaluation
sample was indeed selected randomly among the set of the program eligible localities in the
seven Mexican States in which the program was initially implemented.
[...]The evaluation sample (cf. BASAL y CONTROL) is constituted of rural
(i.e. 50-4,999 inhabitants) and marginalized (i.e. high or very high values of
an underlying proxy-mean poverty score) localities with access to primary and
secondary schools that are located in Progresa catchment areas in the States of
Guerrero, Hidalgo, Michoaca´n, Puebla, Quere´taro, San Luis Potos´ı and Veracruz.
[...]The sample was randomly drawn from the population of those program eligible
localities scheduled to be incorporated in 1997, after stratification by geographic
region (which roughly coincide with States) and population size.
In the regression analysis discussed in the paper, individual school participation decisions
after the program takes place (1998-1999) are a↵ected by the local frequency of program in-
corporated villages over the same period in the areas surroundings their villages of residence.
Hence, beyond the presumed randomness of the evaluation sample vis-a-vis the villages that
were incorporated during the baseline of the program evaluation (1997), we are also inter-
ested in assessing the extent to which the evaluation villages are similar to those that were
incorporated in the program during the subsequent phases of the roll-out of the intervention
in rural areas. Basic socio-demographic variables extracted from the 2000 Mexican popu-
lation census indicate that localities that are lately incorporated into the program are on
average larger and less marginalized (see Panel A of Table A.1). However, the di↵erences
in means between incorporation phases are largely attenuated once we restrict the sample
to those localities that are situated in 5km neighborhoods (as defined in the paper) of the
evaluation localities (see panel B of Table A.1).
⇤Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse Capitole, 21 Alle´e de Brienne 31000 Toulouse
France. E-mail: matteo.bobba@tse-fr.eu.
†Paris School of Economics (INRA), 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris France. E-mail: gig-
noux@pse.ens.fr.
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Table A.1: Socio-Demographics Characteristics and the Phase of Program Incorporation
Year 1997 1998 1999
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: All Localities in the Seven States in which the Program Evaluation Took Place
Size size N=2,249 N=11,987 N=6,124
Poverty mean-score 0.63 0.65 0.61 0.69 0.09 0.88
Nb of Households 70.17 94.71 73.74 99.91 91.35 171.17
Population (age5) 59.58 83.63 63.99 88.98 71.93 141.81
Population (6age<15) 91.47 124.62 96.64 129.09 108.20 204.99
Population (age 15) 202.9 280.1 207.5 279.6 258.1 489.5
Presence of secondary school 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.40 0.22 0.42
% Literate (age 15) 0.69 0.13 0.70 0.14 0.75 0.14
% Children in School (6age<15) 0.90 0.09 0.88 0.10 0.87 0.12
Altitude (meters above see level) 940.2 683.2 1092.7 855.6 1238.5 886.6
% Population in Workforce 0.43 0.11 0.40 0.13 0.39 0.13
Panel B: Only Localities in a 5-km Neighborhood of the Evaluation Sample
Size size N=717 N=3,048 N=829
Poverty mean-score 0.66 0.64 0.67 0.72 0.16 0.99
Nb of Households 68.32 87.73 63.67 74.21 76.63 200.37
Population (age5) 57.78 78.32 55.83 68.24 60.02 149.05
Population (6age<15) 90.12 117.9 84.27 97.85 91.07 214.4
Population (age 15) 198.3 261.4 180.9 211.1 216.0 568.6
Presence of secondary school 0.19 0.40 0.17 0.37 0.20 0.40
% Literate (age 15) 0.68 0.13 0.68 0.15 0.72 0.17
% Children in School (6age<15) 0.90 0.10 0.88 0.10 0.88 0.13
Altitude (meters above see-level) 900.1 682.8 1215.9 842.9 1448.8 833.4
% Population in Workforce 0.44 0.12 0.42 0.14 0.42 0.14
Note: Both Samples of Panel A and Panel B include the 320 evaluation localities that were randomly
assigned to the treatment group.
Table A.2 provides a direct comparison between evaluation localities and the non-evaluation
program beneficiary localities in the seven Mexican States from which the evaluation sample
was drawn and over the period 1997-1999 (see columns 1 and 2). Column 3 reports the
t-statistics of the test of no di↵erences in locality characteristics after controlling for pop-
ulation strata and State fixed e↵ects (as well as a joint F-test) and finds the presence of
some unbalances in a few socio-demographic characteristics. In Column 4 we further restrict
the comparison within the neighboring localities of each evaluation cluster and do not find
evidence of any significant di↵erence between the two samples.
To wrap up, in spite of the random assignment of evaluation villages in 1997, there
may be some unbalancedness between the evaluation sample and the non-evaluation sample
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of Progresa localities after 1997. However, those seem to be minor within the relatively
homogenous group of neighboring villages that are incorporated in the program over the
period 1998-1999 that we consider in our empirical analysis.
Table A.2: Comparison of Means between Evaluation and Non-Evaluation Progresa Localities
Evaluation Non-Evaluation T-test of No Di↵erence
Sample size N=506 N=20,045 N=20,551 N=4,785
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Poverty mean-score 0.47 0.46 0.002 -0.039
(0.73) (0.79) [0.971] [0.112]
Number of Households 52.18 79.09 1.875 1.758
(35.20) (126.4) [0.382] [0.164]
Population (age5) 43.61 66.27 2.459 2.332
(34.89) (107.9) [0.079] [0.063]
Population (6age<15) 66.81 100.10 3.333 2.086
(51.70) (156.6) [0.057] [0.217]
Population (age 15) 147.78 223.49 4.963 5.090
(101.8) (359.3) [0.347] [0.142]
Presence of Secondary School 0.17 0.20 0.024 0.011
(0.38) (0.40) [0.453] [0.516]
% Literate (age 15) 0.71 0.71 -0.013 0.005
(0.14) (0.14) [0.221] [0.263]
% Children in School (6age<15) 0.88 0.88 -0.003 -0.002
(0.10) (0.11) [0.666] [0.612]
Altitude (meters above see level) 1273.63 1116.90 132.739 11.998
(839.7) (852.9) [0.060] [0.153]
% Population in Workforce 0.40 0.40 -0.002 0.001
(0.13) (0.13) [0.792] [0.796]
F Test of Joint Orthogonality 4.375 1.045
[p-values] [0.048] [0.404]
Note: Columns 1-2 report means and standard deviations (in parenthesis). Columns 3-4 display the OLS
coe cients with State fixed e↵ect (Column 3) and Neighborhood fixed e↵ects (Column 4) of the evaluation
dummy along with the p-values (in brackets) for the null hypothesis of no di↵erence between evaluation
and non-evaluation program localities. Population strata are included in both specifications. Standard
errors are clustered at the state level in Column 3 and at the neighborhood level in Column 4.
Turning now to the sample used in the empirical analysis; a direct implication of the pre-
sumed randomness of the evaluation sample is that we should expect no di↵erences in the
survey characteristics measured in the pre-program year (1997) between evaluation neigh-
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borhoods with a di↵erent number of non-centroid evaluation villages after netting out the
independent e↵ect of the local frequency of neighboring non-evaluation localities. A simple
comparison of means between evaluation neighborhoods with and without non-centroid eval-
uation villages is shown in columns 1 and 2 of Table A.3. Column 3 reports the e↵ects of
the number of evaluation villages after controlling for the number of non-evaluation villages
in the neighborhood. Overall, the local frequency of evaluation localities in the neighbor-
hoods of the 506 localities that form part to the Progresa evaluation sample does not seem
to be correlated with pre-program observable characteristics at the individual, locality and
neighborhood-level. This confirms that the set of evaluation localities is a random subsample
of beneficiary localities incorporated after late 1997.
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Table A.3: Baseline Characteristics within the Evaluation Localities
Neighborhood No Evaluation Some Evaluation OLS Coe cient of
Localities Localities Number of Eval (NEj,5)
(1) (2) (3)
School Enrollment 0.64 0.64 0.004
(0.48) (0.48) [0.647]
Individual and HH Characteristics
Age 14.52 14.53 -0.016
(2.02) (2.06) [0.513]
Female (dummy) 0.50 0.51 0.002
(0.50) (0.50) [0.729]
Mother Education (years) 2.36 2.36 0.077
(2.33) (2.35) [0.396]
Father Education (years) 2.20 2.25 0.085
(2.21) (2.30) [0.139]
Centroid Village Characteristics
Share of Program Eligible HHs 0.58 0.60 -0.008
(0.20) (0.19) [0.409]
Presence of Secondary School 0.26 0.24 -0.006
(0.44) (0.43) [0.789]
Distance to Nearest City (Km) 106.4 102.9 4.191
(40.45) (45.59) [0.255]
Neighborhood (radius=5km) Characteristics
Number of Secondary Schools 2.88 3.19 0.037
(2.19) (1.91) [0.800]
Poverty mean-score 0.41 0.57 0.042
(0.56) (0.54) [0.151]
Number of Localities (any) 21.03 25.15 -0.181
(14.00) (11.21) [0.798]
Population density 5.99 8.41 0.572
(6.54) (11.44) [0.575]
F Test of Joint Orthogonality 1.099
[p-values] [0.357]
Note: Columns 1-2 report means and standard deviations (in parenthesis). Column 3 displays the
OLS coe cients of the number of neighboring (within 5km) evaluation localities after controlling for
the number of neighboring (within 5km) non-evaluation Progresa localities along with the associated
p-values (in brackets). State fixed e↵ects are included in all specifications. Standard errors are
clustered at the level of groupings of partially overlapping neighborhoods.
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B Consistency of the OLS coe cients When One or
More Regressor is Endogenous
A general writing of the linear regression model we consider is
y = x1 1 + x2 2 + u
where x2 is a matrix of endogenous explanatory variables, i.e. E(x02u) 6= 0 and x1 is a matrix
of explanatory variables that are exogenous, i.e. i.e. E(x01u) = 0.  1 and  2 are (column)
vectors of coe cients and u is a vector of the error terms.
In our specific case, x2 is the number of potential beneficiary villages NP , while x1 is the
number of actual beneficiary villages NB. While NB is correlated with treatment density
and hence potentially associated with unobserved determinants of outcomes captured by the
residual u in an unconditional model, it is not anymore when we control for NP . This is
because the residual variation in NB is then solely determined by the random number of
treatment group villages in the neighborhood. The model we estimate is formally similar to
the general model above, as the same estimates can be obtained using the variables NC and
NP , and NC is exogenous while NP is endogenous; we indeed have:
y =  1N
B +  2N
P + u =  1(N
P  NC) +  2NP + u =   1NC + ( 1 +  2)NP + u
Using the partitioned matrix notation, the vector of OLS coe cients is given by✓
 ˆ1
 ˆ2
◆
=
✓
x01x1 x
0
1x2
x02x1 x
0
2x2
◆ 1✓
x01
x02
◆
u
Since x2 is random conditional on x1, it follows that the two set of explanatory variables are
uncorrelated with each others: E(x01x2) = 0. Hence, the variance V (x1, x2) of the full set of
covariates in the right-hand side term converges asymptotically to✓
x01x1 x
0
1x2
x02x1 x
0
2x2
◆
!
✓
E(x01x1) 0
0 E(x02x2)
◆
Using the independence of x2 from u, the product of the last two terms converges to✓
x01
x02
◆
u!
✓
E(x01u)
0
◆
So the vector of coe cients converges asymptotically to✓
 ˆ1
 ˆ2
◆
!
✓
 1
 2
◆
+
✓
E(x01x1)
 1E(x01u)
0
◆
To summarize, the OLS coe cients  ˆ2 are consistent estimates of the marginal e↵ects of the
exogenous variables,  2. On the other hand, the OLS coe cients on the endogenous variables
 ˆ1 are biased, due for instance to omitted variables, but this bias does not contaminate the
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coe cients estimated for the exogenous variables to the extent that those are uncorrelated
with the endogenous variables. In our setting, this is likely the case because the partial
variation in NB (i.e. after netting out the e↵ect of NP ) solely captures the randomized
allocation into treatment of evaluation localities.
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